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GIVING ORDERS IN RURAL SOUTHERN RHODESIA:
CONTROVERSIES OVER AFRICANS' AUTHORITY IN
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS,

1928-1934*

By Carol Summers
In Southern Rhodesia during the 1920s and 1930s, government officials,
missionaries, and educated Africans saw African communities in crisis.
Individualismthreatenedcommunalidentities.Customsand values were mutating
undereconomic, social, and politicalpressurefrom an increasinglysegregationist
settler-dominatedstate. In this context, policymakers held two potentially
values:orderandprogressivechange.And they saw schools and their
contradictory
surroundingcommunitiesas the most importantpotential sources of ordered
change. The Jeanesprogram,importedfrom the UnitedStatesin the wake of the
Phelps-StokesCommission,was the single mostprominenteffortto reconcileorder
andchange,communalvaluesandambitiousindividualism.
This articlefocuseson the periodfrom 1928 to 1935, Depressionyears, when
HaroldJowittwas directorof nativedevelopment.Duringtheseyears, debatesover
the Jeanes teacher program, and specifically over the careers of Matthew
Magorimbo and Lysias Mukahleyi, exposed both the needs that drew the
administrationand missions toward community-baseddevelopment, and the
questionsof power,authority,andresourcesthatblockedcommunitydevelopment,
andmorespecificallythe Jeanesteacherprogram,fromachievingits statedaims.
Native Development Politics
In 1928, Harold Jowitt inherited a troubled program. Many within the
administration
of SouthernRhodesiahad some conceptof nativedevelopment,but
the bureaucraticstructureof developmentprogramswas confusing, chaotic, and
conflict-provoking.An ambitiousand articulatespecialistin Africaneducationand
development,Jowitt's first task as directorof nativeeducationwas to expand the
scope of his department.He rewrotethe Native EducationAct of 1928 into a far
more sweepingNative DevelopmentAct of 1929 and hireda staff of government
nativeschool inspectors.Native development,he argued,was based on education
but extendedfar beyond the classroom.Jowitt'sNative DevelopmentAct defined
the department'sscope as "theeducationof Natives and any otherwork primarily
designedto furtherthe agricultural,industrial,physical or social advancementof
Natives."1
*

The earliest version of this article was presentedat the African Studies Association meeting
in Orlando,Florida, in 1995. The article drawson researchsupportedby a National Academy of
Education(Spencer Foundation)postdoctoralfellowship and by faculty researchgrants from the
University of Richmond.
1 Report of the Director of Native Developmentfor 1929 (Salisbury, 1930), 1.
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Jowitt'sbroaddefinitionof nativedevelopment,and his ambitiousattemptsto
limitedfunding.By the end of his first
pursueit, outstrippedhis new department's
year, he was campaigningfor more resources.The department'sinspectorscould
not visit all schools. The missions could not intensifytheirefforts without higher
governmentgrants. And teachersneeded increasedand standardizedsalaries if
missionswere to promoteteachereffectivenessand attractand retainteacherswith
higherqualifications.2Jowitt quickly realized,however, like others before him,
was not willingto providemoremoneyfor Africaneducation
thatthe administration
and development.3He thereforeattemptedto pair economy with expansion by
and settlerelite: he
recruitingallies for his visions from outsidethe administration
attemptedto produceregulationsthatwouldtransformmissionariesand the mission
school system into a moreeffectivetool of government;he sought to upgradethe
educationof Africanteachersto makeclassroomsmore effective, disciplined,and
regulated;and he reached out to the internationaleducational development
communityto seek externalmodelsandsponsorsfor developmenton the cheap.
The JeanesTeacherprogram,one of the most focused attemptsat community
development,broughtthesethreesourcesof extragovernmental
supporttogether.It
was modelledon a programthattrainedvisitingteachersfor black schools in the
AmericanSouth.SouthernRhodesiancandidateswere educatedChristians,ideally
with some teaching experience,nominatedby their missions, and admittedto
training.Jeanes programs sought to give African men and women advanced
training in the basic skills of community development: hygiene, school
improvement,industrialskills, medical aid, and domesticity.After a course at
DomboshawaSchool anda community-based
internship,the menwould go back to
the missions thatsponsoredthem. Workingundera missionarysupervisor,each
manwouldhaveresponsibilityfor a circleof ruralschools.He was requiredto visit
the schools, help teachersimprovetheirtechniques,sponsor school gardenplots,
and directthe studentsin manualand industrialwork. But he was to do more,
reachingout from school to community:helpingwith cleanups,overseeinglatrine
digs, and providingsuggestions for cooperativeorganizationsranging from the
schools' parentcommitteesthroughcommunalwork parties. The male Jeanes
teacherwouldbe workingwith denominational
schools, and reportingto a mission
supervisor.But he would be paid by the Native DevelopmentDepartmentat a
substantiallyhigherlevel thana regularmission-employedteacher.4Jeaneswomen,
2 Reportof the Director of Native Educationfor 1928 (Salisbury 1929), 8.
3 Unlike the Native Department'sspending,which could be characterizedas essential to law,
order,and tax collection, educationand developmentwere discretionaryexpenses without strong
white constituencies.
4 The mission salariesfor certificatedteachersrangedas low as ?2 per month for nine or ten
months of the year. Chibi Mission, DRC, See correspondenceof George Mhlanga and Ndambi
Hliziyo to A.R. Mather, National Archives of Zimbabwe [hereafterNAZ] S2307/2. Jeanes
teachers,however, were paid a probationarysalaryof ?60 per year for the first year, and offeredat
least the theoreticalpossibility of increasing, in steps of ?3 per year of experience, with three
gradesbased on merit, to a ceiling of ?120 per year. They also received bicycle allowances of
7s/6d. per month and at least the possibility of a futurepension. Colonial Secretaryto DND, 17-730, NAZ S 170/1225.
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nominatedby missionsuperiors,andthentrainedat HopeFountain,filled a slightly
differentrole. Theircurriculumskippedtrainingin teachersupervision.And they
were not tied to specific schools. Instead,they were encouragedto live with their
families,transformtheirhomesinto modelsof domesticity,and reachout from that
homebase throughdemonstrations
of domestichygiene,cookery,and sewing, and
through providing health services ranging from dispensing through wounddressingto midwifery. Jeanes women were also supervisedby missionariesbut
paidby the NativeDevelopmentDepartment.5
Ideally, the Jeanesprogramwas supposedto be catalyticand participatoryas
the teachersused schools and reformedand cleaned up homes to spark off a
revolutionof progressivedevelopmentby Africanobserverswho saw, believed,
andcopiedthe teachers'initiatives.Impressedby this vision, missionssent some of
theirmost promisingyoung men and women, the CarnegieCorporationprovided
externalaid money, and the departmentdevelopedthe new trainingprogramsat
DomboshawaandHope Fountain.
The programprovokedcontroversieswithinthe administration,
however.Even
before Jowitt's Jeanes program,the Native Departnenthad fought against the
Native DevelopmentDepartmentfor controlover the trainingand stationingof all
Africansinvolvedin developmentwork,such as agricultural
demonstrators.Under
NativeDepartmentpressure,as the first agricultural
at Domboshawa
demonstrators
completedwhat they had expectedwould be a two-year trainingprogram,their
supervisor,E.D. Alvord,declaredthemwoefullyunderprepared
for the tasks ahead
andproposeda thirdyear of apprenticeship
nearthe school with close oversight.6
Following Native Departmentideas despite his own backgroundat the American
Board mission, Alvord continuedthe patternof condemningmission training,
standards,and achievementswith scathingcommentarysuggesting that mission
schooling was not up to standardeither academicallyor agriculturally.7The
discussions and disagreementsover the agriculturaldemonstrationprogramwere
resolved, uneasily, by a bureaucraticrearrangement
that accepted the Native
Department'shegemony:Alvord, and all his demonstratorswere placed in the
Native Department,underthe commandof the chief native commissioner(CNC),
and,in variouslocalities,underthe relevantnativecommissioner.Alvordfollowed
an aggressiveprogramof oversight, holding before- and after-harvestmeetings
witheach demonstrator
andmonitoringplowing,planting,andlandmanagement.
The trainingprogramfor Jeanes teachersbegan in 1929 in this context of
controversyover the trainingand controlof Africanagents. Even more than the
agricultural
demonstration
program,Jowitttailoredthe Jeanesprogramto his own
notionsof how the government,missions, and progressiveAfricanscould work
S The governmentestablishedthreegradesof pay for female Jeanes teachers,ranging from a
low of ?15 per year for beginning teachersto a high of ?48 per year for top-ranked,experienced,
Jeanes women. It is not clear, however, whether anyone ever actually received the top salary
allowed before the programwas ended. Public Services Boardto Colonial Secretary, 11-8-30, NAZ
S 170/1124.
6 NAZ S138/69, Acting CNC to Treasury, 19-8-26.
7 NAZ S 138/69, Alvord to CNC on trainingof demonstratorsat Domboshawa, 10-10-27.
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togetherfor development.Jowittwas bluntin pointingout thathe had writtenthe
grantproposalthatfundedthe programandthatthe missions had sent on theirbest
peoplewith the assurancethatthesepeoplewouldbe returnedto them.
Some early, glowing, reportsprovide glimpses of the types of community
improvementthe programwas designedto produce.JohnMarsh,the supervisorof
the AmericanBoard'sChikoremissioncircuit,reportedthat"thisventureis one of
the most significantsingle stepsin the progressof Nativeeducationin Rhodesia."8
Othersupervisorsagreed, providingspecific examplesto back this claim. Titus
Mngadi,a London MissionarySociety (or LMS) Jeanes Teacherworking in the
HopeFountaindistrict,had organizedmaterialsand supervisedthe constructionof
a dispensaryto be run by the local Jeanes woman.9 Jeanes TeacherZhakata,
working in the Selukwe Reserve, ran monthly teachers' meetings with
demonstration
lessons and promotedthe establishmentof school gardenscarefully
fertilizedby manure.10Mac Sitolepushedteachersto institute"handwork"lessons
in the schools and manageda circuitof schools withoutEuropeanoversightwhile
his missionarysupervisorwent on furloughfor three months.11Jeanes teacher
Ndebeleworkedto improveroadsandestablishvegetablegardensfor each school.
He also met with parentsandheadmenand,like his colleagues,gave demonstration
lessons to teachers,providingacademicand pedagogicalsuggestions of how to
understandand teach the newly revised curriculum.12 For their missionary
supervisors, Jeanes teachers' most impressive achievements were the large
communitymeetingstheycalled,at whichtheylecturedon "theaims and objectsof
the school and the necessity of the childrenhaving properequipmentand being
cleanalways."13
Missionsupervisorswere impressedby Jeanesteachers'abilityto involve the
largercommunitywith the schoolandthe schoolwiththe largercommunity.Jeanes
teacherssponsoredparentalinvolvementthroughparentcommitteesand called for
parentsto show their supportby providingmanurefor school gardens, helping
withploughingor roadbuilding,andbuyingschoolmaterialsto equip theirchildren
properly.Jeanesteachersalso calledfor studentsto bringthe school values to the
broadercommunityby doing cleaningraids, where a groupof studentswould go

8 J. Marsh, Report Jeanes Teachers'work, Chikore Kraal schools, Jan.-June 1933, NAZ
S 1542/J1/v.3.
9 Report on Titus Mngadi, Jeanes Supervisor,Hope FountainDistrict, Jan.-June 1933, NAZ
S1542/J1 v.3.
10 Ibbotsen, Report on the Work of A Zhakata(JT Selukwe) July-December 1933. NAZ

S 1542 JI v. 3.
11 Orner,Report on the Work of Jeanes TeacherMac Sitole, 2d half 1933, 31-12-33, NAZ
S1542/J1 v.3.
12 Steward, Report on J. Ndebele, 1934, NAZ S1542/JI/ v.1.
13 HS Edwards,Report on Jeanes TeacherTimon Zinyemba, Jan.-June 1935 [Filabusi],
NAZ 1542/Ji v.l.
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out andcleanup a "kraal,"sweeping away clutter,possibly buildinga latrine,and
sometimesplantingtrees,flowers,or vegetables.14
Even the most muted supervisors' reports were positive, indicating the
missionaries'hope that the Jeanes teacherswould be effective in their awkward
positionas trainedgeneralistsworkingto bridgethe gap betweenthe more elderly
and reactionaryelements in African communitiesand the mission and Native
DevelopmentDepartmentagendasof progress.Missionariessometimesdecriedthe
15 or accepteda frustratedJeanesteacher'sconclusionthat
"indifferenceof parents"
"his people are not going to change customs over night. He realizes that he is
fightingthe inertiaprevalentamongthe nativepeople-an unwillingnessto do that
which requiresadded effort, even though they are told that benefits may be
derived."116
Missionaries,though, generallypraisedJeanes teachers'energy, even when
thatenergyproducedsuchseriousantagonismsthatthe teacherhadto be transferred
to anotherregion.17The missionsexpecteda Jeanesteacher,aftera broadtraining,
to examinethe specificareahe foundhimselfin, to workout his own goals, and do
whateverwas necessaryto accomplishthem. By the 1930s, some missionaries
were disgustedwith the slow pace of changein Africancommunities.Missionaries
were limitedin numbersand raciallyconspicuous.They thus found themselvesat
leaston occasionconstrainedby govemmentinvolvementwhen they triedto push
throughmeasuresrangingfrom compulsoryattendancethroughunpaidcommunity
labor. Beating parents to force pupils to attendschool was technicallyillegal.
Forcingschoolchildrenandtheirfamiliesto contributeunpaidlaborto roadbuilding
and gardeningcould not be insisted upon if the Native Departmentintervened.
Jeanesteachersin pursuitof theirgoals, however, mightbe able to get away with
suchcoerciveactswithoutdirectlyimplicatingmissionaries.
And missionarieshad compellingfinancialreasonsfor welcoming the Jeanes
teachersand portrayingthem as successes. The programoffered missions the
opportunityof having the governmentpay salaries to teachers under mission
patronagewho wouldotherwiseprobablyhaveleft the mission in pursuitof wages
commensuratewith theirqualifications.The missions were, by the 1930s, deeply
concernedwith the problemof attrition.Teachers'salaries, never high, actually
droppedas the Jeanesteacherprogramgrew.Missionariesexpressedtheirdesire to
retainthebest and brightestof theirpupils. But they also acknowledgedthatthese
pupils could earnmore as clerks, dip supervisors,foremen, or even independent
14 For a descriptionof one particularlydramaticclean-up and construction party involving
several Jeanes Teachers, see J. Marsh, circular, Community Work at Mount Silinda, 1-10-30,
AmericanBoard of Commissionersfor Foreign Missions [henceforthABC] 15.4 item 15.
15 Report on Johnson Shumba, for first half of 1935, NAZ S1542/Jl v.1.
16 Adkins, reporton JT Samson Zinoire, MarangeReserve, 10-7-34, NAZ S1542/Jl v.1.
17 See the Report on Jeanes TeacherWork at All Saints Mission Wrenninghamfor half year
ending June 1934, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1, which describedan "excellent"Jeanes teacherin a region of
"especiallybad"schools, who "may have been possibly a bit hasty in some of his methods of
presentation"and should thereforebe relocated.
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builders.Sponsoringprize pupils into the program,however, offeredthe prospect
of the administration
payingfor the missions to retaintheirtop talent,the men and
womenmissionariesexpectedto becomeleaders.18
The programalso offeredthe vision of anothermonetarybenefit:with Jeanes
teachersworkingto upgradethe outschools,the missionmightto be able to expand
further with less investment of increasingly scarce mission funds. Mission
operationswere expensiveprimarilybecauseof the high cost of Europeanskilled
labor. A white male missionarysupervisinga school circuit(as requiredby the
governentin returnfor capitationand supervisiongrants)could earn a salaryof
hundredsof poundsa year.And in additionto salary,he wouldexpect a substantial
house, a garden,plentifuldomestichelp, educationallowancesfor his children,a
pensionplan,healthinsurance,paidtransport,anda salariedfurlough(sometimesa
year long, going as far away as the United States.) Missions might be able to
economize by substitutingAfricans for Europeansas school supervisors and
developmentworkers.And some missionarieseven admittedthatAfricans,fluentin
the local language, and understandingthe situations, might actuallybe more
effectivethanEuropeancommunityworkers.
This vision of Jeanesteachersas Christian,Africanleaders-effective African
leaders-expandingthe influenceof civilizationand Christianityfrom the school to
the communityas a whole, was too promisingfor missionariesto drop, even in the
face of practicaldifficulties.MissionariesfromSouthernRhodesiadid divergefrom
otherregions'delegatesto a regionalJeanesTeacherConferenceandarguethe need
for supervisionand an emphasis on practicalratherthan academictrainingfor
Jeanesteachers.But they encouragedas many as possible of the local men and
womenworkingas Jeanesteachersto attend,andgive papersin English describing
their work. Such teachers provided powerful images of Africans as experts,
authorities,and professionals.And supervisorsacceptedthe implicationsof this
modelof Africanleadership.19
Despitemissionaryand Native DevelopmentDepartment
hopes, however, the
Jeanes teacherprogramran into difficulties. The programproducedcommunity
workers who arrivedin areas alreadyaffected, sometimestraumatically,by the
changesof the previousthirtyto forty years of Europeaninterventions.Experience
with other governmentworkers and mission activities produced some acute
skepticismandresentmentin the communitiesthe Jeanesteacherwere supposedto
serve. Communities suspected that the program served not just African
communities,but Europeanpoweras well. Both Europeanofficials and indigenous
chiefs and messengers explicitly linked the Jeanes Teacherprogram, like the
agriculturaldemonstrationinitiatives,with Land Apportionmentand the forced
resettlementof large numbersof Africansonto distant,dry, overcrowdedlands.
18 See the CNC's description of meetings in 1932 with various missionaries, including the
Anglican bishop of Mashonaland.CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 12-4-34 NAZ S1542/S2.
19 See the Report of the Inter-Territorial"Jeanes"ConferenceHeld in Salisbury, Southern
Rhodesia on 27 May to 6 June, 1935 (Lovedale, 1936). African delegates did, however, stay at
Domboshawa,a governmentschool for Africans, ratherthan in Salisbury, and their talks were far
more limited in time than those of the white speakers.
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Developmentprogramsallowedgovernmentofficialsto claimthatthey continuedto
takeresponsibilityfor the prosperityandprogressof the Africanpopulationeven as
they passed increasinglyrestrictivelegislationon land, marketing,and cattle.20
More immediately,however, those who lived in the reserves observed a whole
series of levies, ranging from dog taxes throughdip fees, school taxes, and
proposedtaxes on men who were not employedoutside the reserves. In theory,
these monies were all earnarkedfor development.21Those who paid, however,
saw littleimmediateresult,and were unableto controlwhat forms of development
the money went to.22 Senior men may also have resentedbeing lecturedat by
young teachers,andby Jeanesteachersanddemonstrators.
Worseyet, some senior
menclearlyviewed Jeanesteachersand demonstrators
as govemmentagents, sent
to sniff out the best land and makenew expropriations
possible. ParamountNema
of the SelukweReserve, for example,arguedthatthe govemmentwas only trying
to takeland and thatpeople neededmorelandratherthan developmentlessons.23
Jeanesteacherswere also perceivedas new, higher-level,mission servants.And in
areas with substantialtensions between senior men and mission youth, such as
Gutu,this led directlyto confrontationsthatdamagedthe teachers'credibilitywith
eldersandwithNativeDepartmentofficials.24
Jeanes teachers, therefore, could be troubling for financially stressed
communities:they representedoutside influencesin the form of governmentand
mission standardsand rules, but they made demandson the local populationin
20 Correspondencebetween the Director of Native Development (Jowitt), the Colonial
Secretary(Leggate), and H.U. Moffat, NAZ 170/1171/ 1933-4.
21 As an example of this rhetoric,see the RhodesianAgriculturalUnion [RAU] Committee
Report on "The Growing Shortage of Native Labor,"Rhodesia Herald 18-2-27 (filed in NAZ
S 170/164), which proposed a 30s/year surtaxon all men not employed outside the Reserve, to be
paid into a fund for development.The RAU developmenttax was merely a proposal and was not
implemented.Missions, however, did extractdevelopmenttaxes in the form of dip fees, school
taxes, and farm rents. Any mission designatedas a private location (most missions) was able to
raise taxes at will. And for headmen'sresponses to the escalating taxes, see NAZ N9/5/3, a record
of official visits between the administratorand variousgovernmentrecognized chiefs and headmen.
They complainedof dog taxes, constant dipping fees, and the lack of markets for their cattle.
Foggin, the directorof education,claimed in 1921 that the Anglican mission had pioneeredschool
rates. Foggin to Administrator,21-5-21, NAZ S840/1/33.
22 The Native Boards,headedby the local native commissioner, were in theory responsible
for local developmentspending. In practice, they were rarelypermittedto make investments that
would actuallybenefit people: schools, cooperativeshops paying for grain in cash, or subsidized
bus and transitservices. See Leslie Bessant, "CoerciveDevelopment: Peasant Economy, Politics,
and Landin Chiweshe Reserve, Colonial Zimbabwe, 1940-1966 (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University,
1987). Bessant focuses on a later time period, but points to a lack of communitycontrol extending
back into the 1930s.
23 E.D. Alvord (Directorof Native Agriculture),"TheDevelopmentof Native Agriculturein
Southern Rhodesia" (undated typescript memoir, U.S. Department of Agriculture Library,
Beltsville, MD), 19.
24 See the controversyover Hannis Mungazi'srole in Gutu, in Carol Summers, "Educational
Controversies:African Activism and EducationalStrategies in Southern Rhodesia, 1920-1934,"
Journal of SouthernAfrican Studies 20, 1 (March 1994) 3-25.
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termsof labor,loyalty,andmoney.Ratherthanbringingmoney and resourcesinto
ruralareas,Jeanesteacherscalledfor self-help.They recruitedchildrenand parents
to laboron schools, roads, gardens, and communitylayout.25They creatednew
politicalorganizationsin the school parentcommittees,which dividedcommunities
betweenthose who sentchildrento school and those who did not. And they called
for the use of new types of consumergoods thathad to be paid for with money,
rangingfrom the soap essentialto their message of cleanlinessto the slates and
books requiredby schoolchildren,to the cloth and equipmentthat Jeanes women
called for in lessons on sewing, knitting,andcooking.
ConflictsoverJeanesteachersmadetheirway into archivalsources when they
involvedmorethanthe immediatecommunity.Government-appointed
headmenand
"chiefs"could complainto theirNative Departmentofficials, and these officials
responded.During 1934, two Jeanes teachers,MatthewMagorimboand Lysias
Mukahleyi,becamesufficientlycontroversialthatthe entireprogramdesign had to
be revised.
Matthew Magorimbo
Matthew Magorimbowas a Salvation Army Jeanes teacher, assigned to the
Chiweshe Reserve in the Mazoe districtunder the supervisionof the Salvation
Army's Major Stoyle. The SalvationArmy was one of the most aggressively
evangelicalmissions in SouthernRhodesia. In 1929, it employed 120 teachers,
only 28 percentof whom had passed StandardIV (approximately
equivalentto the
U.S. sixth grade, and the government'sproposedminimumstandardfor teachers)
or higher. This did graduallyimprove, so thatjust over half of the teachersit
employed in 1931 had at least StandardIV. But at that point the educational
improvementsstalled, despite mission efforts to increase the recruitmentand
retentionof higher standardteachers.26Improvementsin teachers' qualifications
producedtensionsin the schoolcommunities.Accordingto theNC Mazoein 1932
Duringthe recentpast, particularlythe last two years, the type of kraal
school teacherhas ... alteredfor the worse from the olderresponsibletype
of native with moral force and great personalityto whom the heathen
Natives could and did look up to with respect.In his steadappearsa very
young man who, although better educated, has obviously but little
experience.He certainlycommandsbut little respectfrom the elders but
perhapsexertssome influenceon the youngerpeople, most particularlythe
girls. At any rateit can safely be said thathis mannersand actionsare not
25 This preceded the Jeanes teachers.See CNC Reportfor 1927, p. 5, where he recordsNCs'
reportsof parentalobjections to mission teacheror schools' demandsfor obligatory, unpaidlabor
on teacheror school plots.
26 See the statistical appendices for the Annual Report of the Director of Native
Development 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933. The Salvation Army tried to retain teachersby requiring
studentsin the upperlevels to sign contracts promising to teach for the mission. For evidence of
the Howardcontracts, see Major Furman (SA) to Major Wane (NC), 8-8-34, NAZ S1542/S2.
Studentsagreed to teach one year for each year of training,and remit 10/- a month to the Salvation
Army until trainingfees were paid in full. If a teacherwas dismissed, unpaidfees were to be paid
immediately,ratherthan in installments.Fees were ?6 for each year of training.
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conduciveto that good feeling which appearsto me so necessary to a
thoroughunderstandingbetween the Missionaryand the older and more
influentialnatives. Whilstadmittingthatthe presentsystem of examination
is a necessaryone, I would submitthateducationalqualificationis not the
maincriterionandthattheolderfashionedgreyheadednativeteacherwas in
real Christianityand in the upliftof the Native races more successful than
his moremodemandmorescholasticallyeducatedbrother.27
Faced with these tensions between senior men and younger, educated,Christian
teachers,the SalvationArmybackedits convertsagainstthe eldersandgovernment,
increasinglyactingin ways the nativecommissionerperceivedas adversarialrather
thanworkingtowardorderandcooperativedevelopment.
Under the pressures of the Depressionand without increased government
supportfor schools, the Armybeganto move awayfrom the standardlocal schoolcenteredmissiontowarda more international
evangelicalmodel. It appliedto open
schools thatwould provideonly religioustraining,not even attemptingthe basic
school code.28 It worked to stake out territory,even in the face of community
opposition, to block the expansion of rival missions such as the Wesleyan
Methodists.29And it held revivalsand nightmeetingsto generateenthusiasmand
converts,producingmorethanits shareof parentalcomplaints.30
Evenmorethansome of the moreconventionalmissions, the SalvationArmy
embracedthe ideaof the Jeanesteachersas a way for Africansto acceptsome of the
burden of mission leadership, sparing white missionaries from school
administration
and teaching.Missionariesalso saw these programsas ways of
promotingdevelopmentbased on community, ratherthan mission, resources.
ReflectingSalvationArny concernsaboutterritory,ratherthanschool contentand
quality,MatthewMagorimbobeganhis Jeaneswork not just with school lessons,
but with publicworksprojects.31In 1933,he coordinatedthe constructionof roads
to schoolsin his area.In 1934,he calledup workpartiesto "terrace"(reinforce)the
new roads to preventthemfrom washing away in the rains.32He also worked to
establishschool gardensfor each of the schools under his supervision. In the
Chiweshe reserve, an area that was becoming increasinglydensely settled, he
markedout school plots rangingfrom four acres for KanokamweSchool to 8.1
acresfor GunguweSchool. These school plots, most of which were nearlyfive
27 Annual Report of the NC Mazoe for 1932, NAZ S235/509.
28 Assistant NC Goromonzi to NC Salisbury, 13-9-33, NAZ S1542/S2. The schools were
Mupandawanaand Mashambanaka.The assistantNC recommendedauthorizingthese schools.
29 See Assistant NC Goromonzi to NC Salisbury, 8-4-35; and Assistant NC Urungwe to
NC Lomagundi, 19-5-33, NAZ S 1542/S2.
30 Report of the NC Mazoe for 1929, NAZ S 1561/64.
31 The NC did accuse Magorimboof laying stress on the religious and scholastic aspects of
school life ratherthan appropriateindustrialtraining. Annual Report of the NC Mazoe for 1933,
NAZ S235/5 11. The scholastic and religious aspects of Magorimbo'srole, however, are not well
documented.
32 Reporton Jeanes TeacherMagorimbo, 14-8-34, NAZ S1542/J1/v.1.
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acres, defied governmentregulationsthat a school could occupy no more than a
two-acreplot with an additionalfive acresfor the teacher.Magorimbo'sdesignation
of school plots was in additionto the privategardenscultivatedby teachersand
their wives.33 The school gardens were probably ploughed by parents and
cultivatedby studentlabor, with the proceedsgoing to the mission.34Magorimbo
also reported constructing a new school building of Kimberly brick, an
improvementover the wattleand daubof the earlierstructure,and a buildingthat
provideda model for communityimprovementby encouragingthe constructionof
Kimberlybrickhouses for severalimportantmen.35Accordingto a highly critical
nativecommissioner,Magorimbowas pushing for people to change "theirentire
way of life."36
TheNC Mazoewas neverreallyin favor of the Jeanesteacherexperiment,as
he worriedabout alien natives, new ideas, and how to maintaincontrol. When
Magorimbofirstcameintothe area,the NC complainedthathe did not understand
the programand had not been properlynotified as it developed. And as for
Magorimbohimself,
I am entirelyin the dark as to whetherhe is to be under my control or
merely a free lance wanderingat will and possibly teachingat will any
subjecthis fancy dictates.... it is more than likely that the teacherwould
have been arrestedby my Native Messengersfor removingto this District
from Charter without my permission, for I have given them strict
instructionsto arrestall Natives of otherDistrictswho are residentin this
districtwithoutmy permission.37
Magorimbo'spresenceandauthorityviolatedthe NC's ideasand methodsof native
administration.
He went on to implythatMagorimbowas trulydangerous:
I feel it hardlyfair thata Native Commissionershouldbe held responsible
for the behaviorof the Nativesof his districtwhenindividualssuch as these
areallowedto wanderthroughReservesunder,as faras I am at the moment
aware, no control ... certainly not under the control of the official
responsiblefor the welfareandgood behaviorof theNativepopulation.38
By 1934, Magorimbo'sinitiativeshad led the Jeanesteacherinto conflictwith
seniorlocal men andwiththe NativeDepartment,andproduceda clash betweenthe
Native Department(which backed the senior men) and Native Development
Department(which sided with Magorimboand the mission). Two local men,
33 NC Mazoe to CNC, 6-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1/v.3. The new regulations were spelled out in
DND to Missionary Superintendents,circ. 1/34, 15-1-34, NAZ Historical Manuscripts, MET
3/18/1/1, a file that includes the circularssent by the DND to missionarysuperintendents.
34 This was the common patternuntil regulations were passed to restrict obligatory unpaid
laborand specify thatthe pupils and/orteacherreceivedthe produce.
35 Annual Report of Matthew Magorimbo, as reportedby the NC Mazoe to CNC, 1934,
NAZ S1542/J1/v.3.
36 NC Mazoe Annual Reportfor 1934, NAZ S 1563/1934.
37 NC Mazoe to CNC, 1-2-33, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
38 Ibid.
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sworeout affadavitsthatMagorimbohadnot, indeed,
GwesheandChirwanemuka,
constructedthe Kimberlybrickbuildingshe claimedto havebuilt. The new school,
Gweshe claimed, was built by Thomas, a local builder. Magorimbo's only
involvementwas coming and tellingThomasto build it.39 In February1934, the
tensionbecameacute when, respondingto local complaintsaboutthe amountof
landthe schoolswere fencing, the NC Mazoewrote a message callingMagorimbo
into his office for discussions.Magorimbodid not show up on the appointedday,
nor did the NC receive any excuse.40 Magorimbo'sfailure to respond to this
summonsprovidedthe NC with a legal rationalefor prosecution,and the chief
nativecommissionerwith a test case on the issue of who had what authorityin the
reserves.
Both Magorimboand his mission sponsors viewed Magorimbo'sposition in
the Chiweshe reserve as one of authority,not obedience. And while he was
nominallyunderthe controlof MajorStoyle, his local supervisorand the Salvation
Army's territorialcommander, Magorimbo had a substantial measure of
independenceto designhis own projects,decide what to do on a day-to-daybasis,
and coordinateother Africans in projects involving semi-forced labor. When
peremptorilysummonedto attendon the NC, Magorimbowaitedto consultMajor
Stoyle, who calledin his own superior.The superiorwrote a sharpletterto the
CNC,rebukingthe local nativecommissionerfor his interferencein Jeanesteacher
and educationalactivities.41And when the native commissionerbegan to order
teachersto takedown fencing aroundschool gardensthat had exceeded the twoacrelimit,at least one teacherrespondedthathe would have to talk to Magorimbo
first.42The NC Mazoe, who felt that Magorimbo'spowers were diametrically
opposedto the ordernecessaryfor propernativeadministration,
was appalled,as
werehis superiorsin the NativeDepartment,andotherofficials.43
The correspondence
regardingthis disputewentup the administrative
hierarchy
all the way to the premier,who heldthe portfolioof ministerfor nativeaffairs.The
most serious issue, the CNC emphasized,was thatof control, and "as far as the
Nativesareconcerned,MajorStoyleandhis JeanesTeacherhave publicallyflouted
the authorityof the Native Commissioner."44The CNC attemptedto quash
Magorimbo'smissionarydefendersby emphasizingto MajorStoyle that"I wish it
39 Gweshe, Affadavit, 15-2-34, NAZ S1542/J1/v.3. See also Chirwanemuka,Affadavit, 222-34, same file.
40 CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, NAZS1542/J1/v.3.
41 TerritorialCommander,Salvation Army, to CNC, 15-3-34, S1542/J1/v/3.
42 CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, S1542/J1/v.3.
43 For the NC's reaction, see the NC Mazoe Annual Report for 1934. For the reactions of
Major Wane's superiors, see CNC [Carbutt] to Minister of Native Affairs, 12-4-34, NAZ
S 1542/S 1.
44 CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. Note that the CNC did
not specify what sort of control he was concernedabout. Instead,he evoked a more general (and
somewhatfantastic)concept of the native commissioner'sfull knowledge of and authority over all
happeningsin a given territory.
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to be clearlyunderstoodthatwe cannottoleratedirectinterferencewiththe ordersof
a NativeCommissioner,whichis boundto causeconfusionin the Native mind."45
For the Native Department,the problem was not Magorimbo's actual
relationshipwith the local communityor the specific programshe put in place.
Instead, Magorimbo was a problem because of his independence, and his
independentdelivery of orders to local people. Understandingthis, the Native
Departmentofficials did not block Magorimbo'sinitiativesor prosecutehim as an
individual;they sought a settlementthatwould addressthe pertinentissue of face.
Stoyle and Magorimboattendedthe NC in the NC's office, apologized, and then
the NC "insistedon informingMagorimboin his, MajorStoyle's presence,thathe
mustin every instanceobey my instructionsin futureand thatunless he did so he
would be prosecutedthis no matterwhat instructionshe had receivedfrom other
sources."146

Lysias Mukahleyi47
Lysias Mukahleyi'sexperiencesprovidedanothertest case for the Jeanes teacher
initiative.Mukahleyiwas a Dutch ReformedChurch(DRC) Jeanes teacherwho
trainedin the same cohort as MatthewMagorimbo.48He proved even more
controversialthanMagorimbo.Magorimbohadgotteninto troubleby following the
mission line and working to implementhis training. Mukahleyi apparently
perceivedhis goals of communitydevelopmentin morepoliticalterms. Mukahleyi
was one of the best-educatedAfricansaffiliatedwith the DutchReformedmission
in SouthernRhodesia,a missionnotoriousin the regionfor its deplorableschools.
Earlyinspectorswrotescathingdescriptionsof schoolswhere53 out of 97 enrolled
studentswho actuallyattendeda ruralschool sharedamongthemone teacherand
six slates,wherea school of 66 pupils was open for a year withouta schoolroom,
or wherea groupof 48 childrenspent threemonthsstaringat ChartI, to the point
wherethey could reciteit by heart,but not readit.49 In 1929, the DRC employed
425 Africanteachers,makingit one of the most importantmissions in Southern
Rhodesiain termsof numbers.But fewer than 10 percentof those teachershad
passedStandardIV or higher.50The mission expanded,despiteits poor advanced
education,throughits carefuluse of structure.The DRC was probablythe first
45CNC to Maj. Stoyle, 13-3-34, NAZ S1542/Jl v.2.
46 NC Mazoe to CNC, 22-3-34, NAZ S1542/Jl v.3.
47 Lysias' surnameis spelled in a varietyof different ways in differentsources, and in many
documentshe is merely refered to as Lysias. Variantspellings include the following: Mukahlehi;
Mukartyei; Mukahleyi; Mukartyoyi. Lysias himself employed various spellings in different
surviving documents.
48 Both men were in the groupof Jeanes teachersgiven official appointments(on probation)
on 15-2-33. Secretaryto DND, 15-2-33, NAZ S 170/1225. The most senior Jeanes teachershad, by
this time, completed two years of probation. Colonial Secretary to DND, 15-2-33, NAZ
S 170/1225.
49 Lenfestey, Inspection of DRC Mission Morgenster,9-4-23, NAZ S840/1/37.
50 Statisticalappendices,Directorof Native DevelopmentAnnual Reportfor 1930.
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mission to introduceprintedschemes of work (in book form) for a three-year
course prior to StandardI. These schemes were rigid, and DRC education
notoriouslyinflexible.But with the schemes, teachersfar below the government's
StandardIV requirement
couldneverthelessexpandandoperateschoolsthatat least
broughtchildrenup to the level of educationrequiredfor baptism.51Under
governmentpressure,the DRC also providedvacationcourses designed to bring
sub-standardteachersup to a level referredto as the "vernacularcertificate"professionalpreparation
in teachingwith academicwork approximatelyequivalent
to StandardIV, but without the trainingin English.52 Nor was the mission's
disciplinarystructureentirely academic. DRC missions employed attendance
officerswho went out aroundthe schools to enforceschool attendance,which was
recordedcarefullyin the school registerssubmittedfor the government'scapitation
grantsin aid.53DRC missionariesalso triedto controltheirpeople's lives in ways
thatcouldbe highlyintrusiveas they levelledfines for "moraloffenses,"rearranged
marriages,or called for fees, fines, andtuitionand book money in ways thatmade
some DRC missionariespersonallywealthy.54
By the early 1930s, undergovernmentpressure, the DRC was beginningto
hirea few bettereducatedteachers,particularly
from the AmericanBoard schools.
But it only graduallyyieldedgroundto the NativeDepartment'sattemptsto restrict
missionary power. Despite a substantialdemand for better schools in areas
dominatedby the DRC, a governmentinvestigationinto DRC finances and
usurpationof statepower,andthe expulsionof one missionaryas a bad influence,
the DRCheld on.
In the early 1930s, conditionsin the districtchangedin response to a new
governmentprogram:thatof the agricultural
demonstrators.These were men who,
like the Jeanesteachers,studiedat an advancedcourse at Domboshawaand were
then sent into rural areas to work for communitydevelopment.But there the
similaritiesended. The agriculturaldemonstratorswere governmentemployees,
supervisedby the governmentagriculturistfor natives, E.D. Alvord, under the
directcontrolof the native commissioners,and the programwas funded locally,
throughthe Native ReservesTrustfund ratherthanthroughexternalphilanthropic
organizations.Agriculturaldemonstrators
were also supposedto be independentof
the missions.In the Fort VictoriaDistrict,however, they were not. Initiallymet in
the ZimutuReserve with skepticismand hostility, the demonstratorschose to
demonstrateon the lands of mission schools, ratherthanfollowing the prescribed
pathof recruitingcooperatorsfrom amongvariouspeople in the community,each
of whom was to farm an acre accordingto the demonstrator'sdirections.55
51 DND Annual Report for 1929, p. 41.
52 See Directorof Native Development, Annual Reports.
53 The DRC received a grantof ?7,125 in 1929, making it the largest Protestantrecipient of
governmenteducationalmoney.
54 See the investigation into the finances of the DRC in Gutu, NC Gutu to SoN Victoria,
28-4-33, NAZ S15421M8,discussed in Summers,"EducationalControversies."
55 Jowitt to CNC, 11-1-32, NAZ S138/72. Jowitt was reporting Alvord's defense of this
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Demonstrators'
cooperationwith the mission led to suspicionand conflictwith the
NativeDepartmentas the superintendent
of nativesof VictoriaCircle(SoN Victoria)
wroteto Alvordthatit was "notgood policy to allow the Demonstratorto get so
involvedwith mission schools.This fact alonewould accountfor his unpopularity
with the kraalnatives,"and went on to assert that "No demonstratorwill be a
successwithoutthe activesupportandcooperationof the NativeCommissioner."56
The agriculturaldemonstratorsdid not act as a pacifying influence in the
Victoriaregion. The SoN Victorianot only complainedabouttheir connectionsto
mnission
schools,he also emphasizedthatthey had poor manners,complainingthat
"Ihaveoftenbeenparticularly
struckwiththe clownish ill-mannersof those I have
come across.I gatherthatthey are often insolentto theirelders and look down on
those who have not been to school."57Not only did some demonstrators
antagonize
eldersandofficialsthrough"insolence"andmissioninvolvement,they also irritated
theirsponsorsby becomingpoliticallyinvolved.At leastone of the first agricultural
in the Victoriacirclewas an activememberof the SouthernRhodesia
demonstrators
BantuAssociation,a legal organizationpushing the advancementof the rights of
educated Africans.58Local European settlers, furthermore,apparentlydeeply
resentedany programsthat helped Africansraise and sell maize on the local
market.59
Despitethese inauspiciousbeginnings, agriculturaldemonstratorsdid rapidly
builda followingin the ZimutuReserve.By 1932, the agriculturist
was referringto
demonstration
workin the regionas "verypopular."60Demonstratorsacquiredthis
popularityby helpinglocal farmersexpandtheirproductionand sale of maize and
othercash crops. Evidentlythey did so by de-emphasizingthe crop rotationsand
carefulsoil conservationprovisions of theirtrainingand becoming, accordingto
theircritics,"farmmanagersfor thosewho grow maizefor sale."'61Alvord, on the
otherhand,emphasizedthe usefulnessof a substantialmarketfor Africanmaizein
deviation from policy. Alvord arguedthat initially almost no one was willing to have plots, so
demonstratorsworked on mission plots to keep busy and that this was the only case in Rhodesia
where the programbecame so heavily invoved with the schools. Alvord acceptedthat it was not
good for agriculturaldemonstratorsto become mission farmmanagers.
56 SoN Victoria to Agriculturist,3-2-30, NAZS138/2 1927-30.
57 Ibid.
58 Jowitt (DND) to SoN Victoria, 14-2-30, 1?AZ S 13812. The demonstratorwas reproved
for his political involvement by both Alvord and the SoN Victoria.
59 See Alvord, "TheDevelopment of Native Agriculture."
60 Alvord, Report on Before PlantingInspection, 1932-3, 24-1-33, NAZ S 138/2.
61 Assistant NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 9-6-33, NAZ S 138/72. This file contains other
evidence from aroundthe region that the most popular demonstratorswere those who provided
people with what they wanted-help expandingtheirmaize yields-rather thanthe soil conservation
tactics and trainingin intensive fanning that the governmentthought they needed.See NC Mtoko
to CNC, 1-6-33, and NC Zaka to SoN Victoria, 29-4-32. See also Alvord's statement that any
rotationthat did not emphasizemaize would be very unpopular(reportedby Jowitt to CNC 11-132) and also his defense againstchargesthat he was suffering from a "maize complex," Alvord to
DND 8-6-31.
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the region, especiallyin Zimutu,where Africanssold maize to Europeanfarmers
and storekeeperswho then either used it as cattle feed or resold it for higher
Europeanprices.62
Afterseveralyearsof successfuldemonstration
activity,the Native Department
to coordinatethe "centralization"
of the Reserves.
began to use the demonstrators
This meantthat arableland would be distinguishedfrom grazing land and land
holdingswould be fixed, ratherthanbeing subjectto change as individualscame
and went and practicedlong-fallow agriculture.Centralization,however, also
restrictedthe growthof the most successfulmarketfarmersof the region.
Beginninghis workas a Jeanesteacher,LysiasMukahleyifoundhimselfin the
midstof controversiesover who was in controlof the DRC-dominatedregions.
Being paidby the governmentandworkingfor the DRC in ways thatwere intended
to serve the African community,Mukahleyifound himself in the midst of a
triangularcontradiction:
the governmentand DRC mistrustedeach other, and both
mistrustedAfricans, who returnedthe sentimentto varying degrees, sometimes
choosing to pursue Zionist strategiesor explicit political involvement, which
irritatedbothgovernmentandmission.The Jeanesideal of nonpoliticalcooperative
developmentin a Christianframeworkwas probablynevera realpossibilityin such
a politicallymuddledregion. Mukahleyiapparentlydid not even try to avoid
politics.
Mukahleyi was an early member of the Southern Rhodesia Native
Association,becomingthe secretaryof the local brancheven as he moved into the
Victoriacircle to begin his work as a Jeanes teacher.63For conservativeNative
Departmentofficials, this politicalinvolvementimmediatelymade him suspect.
Howman, the superintendentof natives of the Victoriacircle, complainedat the
beginningof 1934 thata "Weakstreakin [Lysias']mentalcapacity... coupledwith
his politicalleanings,quiteunfitshim for anypositionof independence....he lacks
balance."64

Howman complained of more than just Mukahleyi's personal attitude,
however. He complainedthat within the sensitive political atmosphereof the
ZimutuReserve, the Jeanes teacherwas causing troublefor the communityand
region at large. Howman had been an early opponent of the Jeanes teacher
program,respondingto a queryabouthow the programcouldserve his regionwith
a scathingrejection:
I do not want the Jeanes Teacherto do anythingfor me so long as he
remainsoutsidemy control.I do not know what communitywork means
exactlybutif it consistsof pesteringthe village dwellersto adoptEuropean
methods of hygiene, sanitation,etc., I do not think it worthy of our
support.The JeanesTeachercomes to visit me once a month but I really

62 Alvord to DND, 8-6-31, NAZ S 138/72.
63 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
64 Ibid.
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would preferthat he did not do so as he will only trade on the official
connectionto imposehis wiil on the villagers.65
In this context, Howmanobjectedto Mukahleyinot becauseof his involvementin
some protonationalist
politics, but because regardlessof his specific politics, the
Jeanesteacher'sjob was to push change.Mere membershipin the SRNA would
not necessarilyhavebeen a problem:Mukahleyipointedout in his own defense that
in governmentoffices were also members,
a numberof messengersandinterpretors
and that the organizationwas for the benefit of all, ratherthan being inherently
hostile to the Native Department.66Howman repeatedlyexpressed a desire for
control and the notion that the Native Departmentmust back its own people,
whether those people were NCs, chiefs and headmen, or merely agricultural
demonstrators,rather than supporting the Jeanes teachers who were semiindependentandundermissionsupervision.67
The situationwent from tense to directlyconfrontational
when reportsbegan
floatinginto Howman'soffice fromthe ZimutuReservethatMukahleyiwas trying
"to arrogatepowers." Initiallythese reportswere vague. Howman reportedan
absence of complaintsfrom agriculturaldemonstratorsof interferencein the
centralizationprogramand in fact stated that while he would like to ask for
Mukahleyi'sremoval,"itwill firstbe necessaryto procuresome directevidenceof
wrong-doing."68Howman'sletterindicatinghis desireto get rid of Mukahleyiand
his lack of evidencewas dated10 March1934.The next letterin the file, however,
withthe samedate, indicatesthatHowmanhad found some evidence, or at least a
pretext, with which to accuse the Jeanes teacher. After speaking with the
demonstrators
HowmanaccusedMukahleyiof
agricultural
misleading the natives, disobeying a direct order which I gave him
personally,andfloutingthe authorityand ordersof the Demonstratorswho
aredirectlyresponsiblefor the good orderandwellbeingof agricuturein the
reserve. I definitely instructedhim not to interferein any way with
agricultural
operationsin the Reserveor give the nativesthe impressionthat
he was carryingout ordersreceivedfromme.69
Lysias Mukahleyi, according to Howman, had told people to violate the
centralization
landuse planby grantingpermissionto ploughin the land designated
for grazing.Later,Howmanwent on to statethateight groups of men thathe had
seen hadstatedthatMukahleyihadgiven thempermissionto plough.70

65 SoN Victoria (Howman) to CNC, 6-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
66 Lysias Mukahleyi to DND, 16-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
67 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34; Alvord to CNC, 24-2-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
68 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. Howman admitted that he had
"receivedno complaints from the Demonstratorsin regardto Lysias interferingwith their work,
neitherhave I had any reportsfrom them thatthe Natives are ploughingland reservedfor grazing.
69 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
70 SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
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Howman's acutehostilitymakesthis case somewhatdifficultto sort out. But
thereare severalodd featuresof this file. First, unlikethe files compiledon most
complaints,especiallywithregardto missionmalpractice,or teachers'malfeasance,
thereis a notablelack of affadavitssworn out by witnesses and an equallynotable
lack of specific names given as references. Howman implied that he was
respondingto local complaintsbuthis earlylettersindicateda desirefor any pretext
on which to expell Mukahleyi.Once he had his pretext,Howman acted bluntly,
with all the power his positiongave him:he sent Mukahleyi,in the custody of a
messenger,to go aboutin the communitieswhere he had worked, and orderedthe
Jeanes teacher to publically proclaim himself "an untrustworthyperson."
Acknowledgingthatthis woulddestroyMukahleyi'sabilityto do his job, Howman
went on to ask for his removal.71
Mukahleyitriedto defend himself and mobilizepotentialsupportnot merely
amongthe SRNA (whichmighthavebeen counterproductive
as it would emphasize
his politicalconnections)but from his mission supervisorsand the Departmentof
Native Development.He pointedout in the official recordthat the SRNA was a
legitimateorganization,with manygovernment-employed
members.And he flatly
deniedHowman'smost seriouscharge,thathe had "interferedin any way with the
administrationof the Reserve...."72 Howman made the charge of interference
explicitby pointingto severalviolations:Mukahleyi,he said, had allottedland for
trees and school gardens; persuadedchildren to weed his own garden; and
"constantlyorganizesmeetings"to discussthe workof headmenandthe division of
landby the headmenandchiefs.73
These charges, however, are notablefor how easily they can be explained
within the prescribedwork routineof the Jeanes teacher.Jeanes teacherswere
supposed to encourage the planting of trees and school gardens. Persuading
childrento weed was also well withintheirduties,especially,as Mukahleyi'sdiary
indicated,whenthe weedingwas not on privatelandbut on demonstrationplots for
communitybenefit. And calling meetingsof parentsand communitymembersto
discuss how the communitycould improve itself was essential to improving
schools and providing the workforcenecessary for larger communityprojects
involving hygiene, roads, or anythingelse. Mukahleyihimself complainedthat
Howman and others apparentlymisunderstoodhis attemptsto create parents'
groups for school improvementand communitydiscussions of development.
Mukahleyidescribedsome of the meetings in his diary as being to encourage
obedience to chiefs and headmen.74Apparentlysome of the discussions at
Mukahleyi's meetings got fairly heated. Mukahleyi himself, however, was
71 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
72 SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
73 Ibid.
74 Mukahlehi Diary, NAZ S 1542/J1 v.2. This heavily underlineddocumentin English does
not provide the evidence Howman asserted it did. All Jeanes teachers were requiredto keep
professional diaries of how they spent their time, and submit these regularly to their mission
supervisors.
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apparentlymoreimportantas a facilitatorwho providedcommunitymemberswith a
venue to express theirdisagreementsthan as an agitatorwho told them that they
shouldfeel dissatisfied.75
Howman'sefforts to get rid of Mukahleyidid not work smoothly.Mukahleyi
not only defendedhimself in petitionsto the Native DevelopmentDepartment,he
also mobilizedsupportersamonghis employers.His missionarysupervisortriedto
retainhis servicesby appealingover the native commissioner'shead to the chief
native commissionerthat "Lysias has had a good trainingand is undoubtedly
intelligentand progressive ... [concerning]the educationand uplift of his own
people. This may have made him too self-confident to the Natives in the
Reserves...." But this moderateadmissionof problemswas as far as Reverend
Louwwas preparedto go. He went on to critiquethe Native Department'shandling
of the situation,at leastimplicitly,by arguingthata minorincidenthad been blown
out of proportionby agricultural
demonstrators
who were from differentmissions
and regions and by authoritieswho had acted without seeking reconciliation.
"Lysiashas ... always been most submissive,"and would have listened if the
authoritieshadaskedratherthanorderinghim about.76Jowitt,the directorof native
development,also intervenedwith the CNC,complainingthat"itis difficultfor me,
without clearerevidence, to appreciatethat the actions of the Jeanes Teacher
warranted
instantdismissalwithoutreferenceto thoseprimarilyconcerned."77
Both Louw and Jowitt, like Major Stoyle in the Magorimbocase, were
attemptingto defenda notion of the chain of commandthatran from the Native
DevelopmentDepartmentthroughthe missionsto the Jeanesteachersandfinally the
community.The Department's
oppositionto any loss of the nativecommissioner's
authorityin the reserveswas clearfrombothMajorWane'sresponseas NC Mazoe
and Howman'sresponseas superintendent
of nativesof Victoria.The head of the
Native Department,Colonel Carbutt,stated the supremacyof his department
forciblywhenhe arguedto Rev. Louw thatthe Department
had to act immediately
and was unableto informthe mission in advancebecause"I cannotforesee when
any personis going to misbehave."78
The most seriousissue, however,was not thatof consultations,but of whether
Africans,even educatedandpreparedas Jeanesteacherswere, could be allowedto
wield actualauthority,or whetherthey must remainas supervisedunderlings.On
this, the Native DevelopmentDepartmentand the mission sought to portray
Mukahleyias an actor, an educated,responsiblehumanbeing who should be
granted some autonomy. But the CNC argued that Africans' autonomy was
inherentlysuspect:
75 He repeatedlyassertedthatwhile many people had spoken at the meetings, and all sorts of
commentswere made, that he had only encouragedobedienceand had done nothing that could be
construedas obstructing the demonstrators'program.Lysias Mukahleyi to DND, 16-4-34, NAZ
S1542/JI

v.2.

76 Rev. Loew to CNC, 11-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.

77 DND to CNC 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
78 CNC to Rev. Louw, 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
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the system underwhich the JeanesTeacherswork will always be fraught
with the danger of their exceeding their legitimatefunctions, because
experiencehas shownthatNatives,whenclothiedwith any sortof authority,
nearlyalways abuse it, unless they are kept underthe closest supervision,
whichis not possiblein the case of a JeanesTeacher.79
CNC Carbuttstatedthathe was willing to allow Mukahleyito continueto work
only underdirectsupervisionat a missionstation.
Yet by the beginningof the 1935 school year, even that compromisewas
fallingapart.Rev. Louw proposedto move Mukahleyiback to the ZimutuReserve
to work directlyunderRev. Moller's supervision.But both the CNC and DND
concludedthatsuch a move would be unwise as it would put Lysias directlyback
into the midst of a battle over centralizationand the authorityof agricultural
demonstrators.80
And Lysias himself acknowledgedthe difficultiesof his position
when he noted that he did not like and probablycould not work with Reverend
Mollerand thatkey native messengers, especiallythe head messenger, Mahachi,
wereplanningto get him expelledfromZimutuif he wentback.81
Bureaucratic Squabbles
Magorimboand Mukahleyiprovidedsharpexamplesof cases where the Jeanes
teacherprogrambecamecontroversial.Both cases endedin ceremonialgesturesto
the Native Department.Magorimbowas forced to make a formalapology to the
native commissioner.Mukahleyiwas put underdirect mission supervision after
being forcedto declarehimself an untrustworthy
person. Neitherman had a long
careerin the program,though both survived initial attemptsto oust them and
Magorimbo,at least, went on to a successful careeras one of the first African
school supervisors.82But neitherMagorimbonor Mukahleyi,nor any of the other
Jeanesteacherswho confrontedlocal powers, was immediatelyand permanently
dismissed for disrespectto white or black Native Departmentauthoritiesor to
traditionalauthorities.IndividualJeanesteachersheld theirjobs amidstaccusations
of forcinglabor,illegallymediatingdisputes,andreallocatingland.
IndividualJeanesteacherssurvivedepisodes of Native Departmentopposition
not throughcommunitysupport,or even mission support, but due to intensive
interdepartmental
conflict between the Native Departmentand the Native
DevelopmentDepartment.The wars were fought in minor battles over Jeanes
teacherssuchas Magorimboand Mukahleyi,over teacherswho had not paid taxes
or appearedto a NC as too young to teach and over depictionsof teachersand
schools in annualdepartmental
reports.The frictionbetween the two departments
79 Ibid.
80 C.R. deC. Peele for DND to Rev A. Louw, 24-1-35, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1.
81 Lysias Mukartyoyi to CNC, 10-3-35, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1.
82 Magorimbo became a supervisor for the American Methodist Episcopal mission. H.I.
James, Report for Mrewa, Official Journalof the Rhodesia Annual Conferenceof the Methodist
Church, 1938.
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mayhavebeenpartiallydue to personalanimositybetweentwo rival strong-willed
headsof department,Col. Carbuttand HaroldJowitt. But it was also institutional,
sparkedby the two departments'fundamentally
differentnotions of how authority
shouldbe constructedin the Africancommunitiesof SouthernRhodesia.
TheNativeDepartment
cultivatedanddefendeda conceptof authorityin which
communitieswere headedby "traditional"
elders,headmenandchiefs, who were, if
suitable,grantedofficialrecognitionby the Departmentand kept in line througha
steady diet of ceremonialgestures ranging from salaries through native board
meetings and official visits. On a daily basis, the native commissionerwould
coordinatethe populationby usinghis nativemessengersas go-betweensto deliver
his directives to the "traditionalleadership."The Native Departmentpushed
legislationthat made the native commissionerof the 1930s effectively supreme
withinhis territory:theNativeAffairsAct mandatedthatall Africansmust obey his
reasonable requests. Above the native commnissionerwas the regional
superintendentof natives, the chief native commissioner, and then the
nonprofessionals: the governmental ministers and their staffs. Native
commissionersappearto have seen this structuringof power and authorityas
effectiveandstrong,but also somewhatbrittle.They feareddamageto any one of
the system's key points, whetherthatbe the prestigeof the elders, the menaceof
the messengers,or the independentsuperiorityof the nnativecommissioner.The
structurewas not designedto bendand move. It had no place for ambitiousyoung
men who soughtto gainpowerthroughtheirachievementsor expertiseas teachers,
skilledcraftsmen,prosperousfarmers,or missionemployees.
The Native DevelopmentDepartment,on the other hand, was built arounda
goal of change. It promoteda conceptof developmentand progress ratherthan
Native Departmentideals of order,and sought to reconfigurenotions of authority
withincommunitiesfroma staticvaluedeterminedby age and inheritedposition, to
authorityas a functionof schooling,skill, way of life, and achievement.Orderand
good administrationwere not the highest values of the Native Development
Department.Instead, the Departmentvalued its own concepts of progress and
improvedqualityof life.
Participation and Development
The program's problems, however, were not merely at the level of
interdepartmental
bureaucraticcompetition:they involved the very notion of
authorityin ruralZimbabwe.In its ideal form, the Jeanes teacherprogramwas
supposed to be highly voluntaryas parentsand communitymembersobserved,
decidedwhat they wanted, and then developedtheircommunity'sresourcesand
institutions.This model of consensus-basedvoluntarydevelopment,however, did
not fit the realitiesof reservecommunities.Withinthe increasinglycontrolledand
segregatedcontextof SouthernRhodesia,authorityand economicwell-beingin the
reserves did not come from popular cooperationand consensus but through
preferentialaccess to outsidepatronsand connections.The idyllic assumptionthat
ruralcommunitieswould automatically
work togetherto promotebetterlives was
quitesimply fantasticwithin a contextwhere individualsand families increasingly
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competed for land, access to markets, jobs, building contracts, labor, and
governmentpositions.
Jeanesteachers,and indeedthe other demonstrationprogramsas well, were
based on the idea thatruralcommunitiesmerelyneededto see what was possible
and they would voluntarily sacrifice and work to achieve better lives and
conditions.But the principaldemonstration
thatyounger, educatedmen observed
was thatof Europeans'accumulationof goods andostentatiousdisplayof status.
Whenthe idea of teachingby demonstrationand voluntaryemulationfailed,
therefore,the Jeanesteachersand demonstratorsfollowed the model of authority
thatdominatedthe region's culture,society, and economy:they claimedauthority
based on position and connections,and gave orders, regardlessof whetherthey
actuallyhadthe legal authorityto do so. Thoughtheprogramhadbeeninitiatedas a
cooperative,voluntary,developmentinitiative,it rapidlybecamean earlyexercisein
what Leslie Bessant calls "coercivedevelopment,"relying on orders and force
ratherthaneducationandcollectiveinterests.83
Communitydevelopmentprogramsin SouthernRhodesia suffered because
theywerebasedon an idealof communitythatfailedto fit the realitiesof Rhodesia.
Communityeffortsto mobilize,effortsthatinvolvedboth seniormen and younger
men and women, had been repeatedlyblockedby mission and governmentefforts
to reinterpret
demandsand actions.When seniormen calledfor betterschools and
offeredto pay for them-as Ziki andhis people on the Devuli Ranch, who worked
for AmericanBoardschools-government underfundingand the depressionof the
economy through maize control, destocking, and restrictionson cattle sales
thwartedtheiraims.Whenyoungerandolder men mobilizedthroughthe Industrial
andCommercialWorkers'Unionto petitionfor usefuleducationin the Umchingwe
block of Insiza District, governmentreinterpretations
of their wants led to the
impositionof a projectthatfailedto meettheirgoals.84
The Jeanes teacher initiativewas designed to encourage communitiesto
develop suitablegoals and then provide them with nonpolitical,nonthreatening
ways of pursuingthese goals. In a politicizedenvironmemnt,however, where
goals couldonly be achievedby demandingmoreor takingfrom one groupto give
to another,the Jeanes teachers'close ties to the administrationand missions
hamperedtheirabilityto buildcoalitionswith local parentsand communityleaders.
And teachers'mobilizationof communitiesto discuss politicalproblems created
suspiscionin administrative
officials,rangingfromthe chief nativecommissionerto
the staff of messengerswho coordinatedthe informationflow into local native
commissioners'offices. Caughtbetweenthe variousintereststhey were intendedto
serve, Jeanesteachersresortedto orders and force to produceresults, increasing
antagonismsin the process, antagonismsthatfurtherbrokeapartthe communities
they were supposedto coordinateandbuild.
83 Bessant, "CoerciveDevelopment."
84 Carol Summers, "WalkingAlone in Front?:Teachersin the Rural Schools of Colonial
Zimbabwe" (unpublishedpaper, 1995) and "DemandingSchools: The Umchingwe Project and
African Men's Struggles for Educationin Southern Rhodesia 1928-34" African Studies Review
40, 2 (1997), 117-39.
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The most successfulJeanesteachersprovedto be amongthe least ambitious.
The female Jeanes teachers who provided classes, one-on-one medical help,
voluntaryinformation,and hygiene advice proved little threatand provokedlittle
controversy.The male Jeanes teacherswho focused on the mission schools and
functionedstrictly as teacher supervisors, ratherthan large-scale development
workers, survived to be promotedinto Africansuperintendentswhen the Jeanes
teacherprogramwas phased out in favor of more specialized education and
developmentworkers. This sharplydelimitedpatternof success, however, raised
questionsaboutthe program'scentrallogic. The Native DevelopmentDepartnent
and the missions failed to develop and sustain a programcapable of allowing
cooperative,voluntaryruraldevelopmentto producechangesin the power structure
andways of life of ruralAfricans.RatherthanbringingAfricanstogetheror taking
advantageof any commonintereststhey mighthave, developmentprogramssuch
as the Jeanesteacherprogramsplit them into groups battlingwith each other for
controlof time, labor,resources,andauthority.Ultimately,the programspromoted
faction and dispute about obligationsand the distributionof existing resources,
ratherthan providing mechanismsthroughwhich communitiescould bootstrap
themselves to comfort and affluence. And even the program's controversies
revolvedaroundthe questionof power and who had the authorityto give orders,
ratherthanaroundany questionof what would benefit the most people or create
new communalinstitutionsfor development.
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